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Deadly Trap or Reasonable Danger:
What Standard of Care Applies to
Non-Electrical Injuries from Power Lines?
Lopez v. Three Rivers Electric Cooperative,Inc.'
I. INTRODUCTION
Missouri demands "the highest degree of care regarding dangerous
instrumentalities because of the great risk of injury or death."' However,
Missouri also has held that only ordinary care is required when, in a suit against
an electric utility, the injury was not caused by "the inherently dangerous
properties of electricity."' This Note examines the struggles faced by a divided
court in determining which standard to apply when these holdings conflict.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
On July 29, 1994, United States Army Reserve pilot Kenney Jones, flight
engineer George Lopez, and two other crew members departed in a CH-47D
Chinook helicopter on a training mission.4 Two days later, the helicopter was
training in the vicinity of the Osage River.' As the aircraft was flying at a low
altitude tracking the middle of the river, it "came into contact with power lines
owned by Three Rivers Electric Cooperative (Three Rivers)," resulting in a crash
and killing all on board.6 Evidence at trial indicated that the lines were carrying
7200 volts of electricity at the time of the accident, however, "it [was]
undisputed that electrical voltage was not a cause of the crash or the deaths."'

1. 26 S.W.3d 151 (Mo. 2000).
2. Id. at 162 (4-3 decision) (Price, C.J., dissenting).
3. Id at 158.

4. Id. at 154. Jones "had command and control responsibilities" for the helicopter.
Id at 154-55. Lopez was in charge of monitoring "various aircraft systems and helped
clear the aircraft on turns, but had no direct control of the aircraft." Id. at 155. Crew

member Bruce Nanninga's widow and children filed a separate suit in federal court
against Three Rivers. See Nanninga v. Three Rivers Elec. Coop., Inc., 203 F3d 529,531
(8th Cir. 2000). The CH-47D Chinook helicopter is a twin-turbine, dual rotor, cargo
helicopter manufactured by the Boeing Company. The Chinook's primary military
mission is the "movement of troops, artillery, ammunition" and other heavy lifting and
troop transportation duties. Boeing, CH-47D Chinook, at http:/wlvw.boeing.con'rotor
craftl/military/ch47d/ (last visited Apr. 2, 2001).
5. See Lopez, 26 S.W.3d at 155.
6. Id "[V]itnesses reported seeing the helicopter in flight over the middle of the
... [r]iver at an altitude of approximately 100 feet." Id.
7. Id.
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There was no indication that the helicopter performed any evasive
maneuvers to avoid the power lines.8 At the accident site, the three-eighths (3/8)
inch lines traversed a 939-foot span over the Osage River.9 These lines were
installed in 1975 and had since turned a greenish-brown color, which effectively
camouflaged the lines against the wooded background landscape." Furthermore,
"[t]rees and other vegetation obstructed the view of the supporting structures.""
There were no markings or other warning devices to aid pilots in detecting the
lines.'2 As the power lines were fewer than five-hundred feet above the ground,
they were not regarded as overly dangerous to air navigation to require marking
under Federal Aviation Administration ("FAA") regulations. 3 The FAA
prohibits fixed-wing aircraft from flying below five-hundred feet in noncongested areas, however, there is no such minium for helicopters, which are
required only to fly "without hazard to persons or property on the surface."' 4
Elizabeth Lopez and Penny Jones brought suit against Three Rivers for the
wrongful death of their husbands George Lopez and Kenney Jones. 5 Lopez and
Jones alleged that Three Rivers was negligent in failing to warn aircraft pilots of
the potential danger of flying into power lines spanning the Osage River at the
accident location.' 6 Following a two-week trial, the jury found for the plaintiffs
and awarded them each $2.5 million in compensatory damages and $500,000 in
punitive damages.' 7 The net awards were reduced to $2.75 million for Lopez
and $2.5 million for Jones because the jury assessed ten percent fault to George
Lopez and twenty percent fault to Kenney Jones in their respective causes of
action. "
Three Rivers appealed to the Missouri Court of Appeals for the Eastern
District of Missouri. 9 Three Rivers presented five arguments on appeal.2" First,

8. Id.
9. Id. The lines were suspended at an angle across the river between two "H"
structures. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. (citing 14 C.F.R. § 77.23 (2000)).
14. Id. (quoting 14 C.F.R. § 91.119(d) (2000)).
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. The trial court also ordered prejudgment interest to be paid on the
compensatory damage award. Id.
19. See Lopez v. Three Rivers Elec. Coop., Inc., Nos. ED 75011, ED 75072, ED
75073, 1999 WL 1054771, at *1-2 (Mo. Ct. App. Nov. 23, 1999), transferred,26 S.W.3d
151 (Mo. 2000).
20. See Lopez v. Three Rivers Elec. Coop., Inc., 26 S.W.3d 151, 161 (Mo. 2000).
Three Rivers also raised a number of other issues that were not addressed because they
were not properly preserved. Id. Lopez also raised issues on cross appeal, but failed to
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Three Rivers argued that it owed no duty to Lopez and Jones because the
accident was not foreseeable.2 ' Second, even if it owed a duty to Lopez and
Jones, it should have been held only to "ordinary care," not the "highest degree
of care," which was the instruction submitted to the jury." Third, evidence of
a similar accident involving an airplane crashing into lines at the same location
in 1975 should not have been admitted because that accident was too remote in
time.23 Fourth, there was insufficient evidence to warrant the submission of
instructions regarding an award for aggravating circumstances.2 Finally, Three
Rivers argued that Missouri Revised Statutes Section

5 3 7 .6 7 5 (2 )

was

unconstitutional because it allowed the attorney general to collect half of any
punitive damage award on behalf of the state.26 Because Three Rivers
challenged the constitutionality of a Missouri statute, the Eastern District
transferred the appeal to the Missouri Supreme Court.27
Judge Covington delivered the majority opinion' The court found that
Three Rivers owed a duty to Lopez and Jones because there was ample evidence
to support the conclusion that Three Rivers either knew or should have known
of a risk of harm to pilots." However, the majority held that ordinary care, not
the highest degree of care, was the proper standard and found that Three Rivers
was unfairly prejudiced by the "highest degree of care" jury instruction.3 The
court determined that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting
evidence of a similar accident involving a fixed wing airplane in 1975.?' Finally,
the court held that the "evidence did not show that Three Rivers knowingly
violated a duty or that it was completely indifferent to or consciously disregarded
preserve her claims. Id.
21. Id. at 155. "Specifically, Three Rivers claims that it did not owe any duty to
Lopez and Jones because [it] could not foresee that the power lines would cause injury
to pilots." Id.
22. Id. at 157.
23. Id. at 159.
24. Id. at 160.
25. Mo. REV. STAT. § 537.675(2) (2000).

26. See Lopez v. Three Rivers Elec. Coop., Inc., Nos. ED 75011, ED 75072, ED
75073, 1999 WL 1054771, at *1-2 (Mo. Ct. App. Nov. 23, 1999), transferred,26 S.W.3d
151 (Mo. 2000).
27. Id. The Missouri Constitution "vests the Missouri Supreme Court with the
exclusive jurisdiction to decide cases in which the validity of a state statute is
challenged." Id. at *1 (citing MO. CONST. art. V, § 3).
28. See Lopez v. Three Rivers Elec. Coop., Inc., 26 S.W.3d 151, 154 (Mo. 2000).
The court was split in the decision 4-3, with Chief Justice Price authoring the dissent.
Id. at 162.
29. Id. at 156. However, whether Three Rivers breached its duty to Lopez and
Jones is a question of fact for the jury. Id. at 157.
30. Id. at 158.
31. Id at 159-60. The court indicated that remoteness in time is "but one factor,"
and goes to the weight of the evidence in most circumstances. Id. at 160.
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the safety of others," and as such, the evidence did not "clearly and convincingly
support an instruction for aggravating circumstances." 32 Because the court
decided that punitive damages were not available, it did not render a decision on
the constitutionality of Missouri Revised Statutes Section 537.675(2)."
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
To recover in tort, a plaintiff must first show that the defendant owes him
a duty.' The existence of a duty is a question of law.3" The Missouri Supreme
Court in Hoover'sDairy,Inc. v. Mid-America Dairymen,Inc. 36 announced that
when the duty itself does not arise from a relationship between the parties,
"foreseeability that some injury might result from the act complained of
normally serves as the paramount factor in determining the existence of a
duty.",37 In determining whether a defendant's conduct creates a duty to a
plaintiff, foreseeability is forward looking; thus, a defendant owes a duty if it
should have foreseen a risk to a plaintiff under the given circumstances. 8
However, when determining proximate causation, foreseeability is judged in
hindsight; thus, a defendant's act is the proximate cause of a plaintiff s injury if,
after the accident has occurred, it is determined that the defendant "knew or
ought to have known that there was an appreciable chance some injury would
'
result."39
In Zuber v. Clarkson ConstructionCo.,40 the court held that for a duty to
exist, there must be some probability of harm against which an ordinary person
would guard.4' That court defined foreseeability as follows:
[S]ome probability or likelihood, not a mere possibility, of harm
sufficiently serious that ordinary men would take precautions to avoid
it .... [T]his does not mean the chances in favor of the happening

32. Id. at 161 (citations omitted).
33. See id.; Mo. REV. STAT. § 537.675(2) (2000).
34. See Hoover's Dairy, Inc. v. Mid-Am. Dairymen, Inc., 700 S.W.2d 426, 431
(Mo. 1985).
35. See Aaron v. Havens, 758 S.W.2d 446,447 (Mo. 1988).
36. 700 S.W.2d 426 (Mo. 1985).
37. Id. at 431-32 (citing Lowrey v. Horvath, 689 S.W.2d 625, 627 (Mo. 1985);
Joyce v. Nash, 630 S.W.2d 219, 222-23 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982)).

38. See Taylor v. Dale-Freeman Corp., 389 S.W.2d 57, 60-61 (Mo. 1965); Zuber
v. Clarkson Constr. Co., 251 S.W.2d 52, 55 (Mo. 1952); Poelstra v. Basin Elec. Power
Coop., 545 N.W.2d 823, 827 (S.D. 1996).
39. Callahan v. Cardinal Glennon Hosp., 863 S.W.2d 852, 865 (Mo. 1993)
(quoting Tharp v. Monsees, 327 S.W.2d 889, 894 (Mo. 1959)); see also Poelstra,545
N.W.2d at 827 (For proximate cause, foreseeability relies on hindsight.).
40. 251 S.W.2d 52 (Mo. 1952).

41. Id. at 55.
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must exceed those against it. The test is not the balance of
probabilities, but of the existence of some probability of sufficient
moment to induce the reasonable mind to take the precautions which
would avoid it.42
Once a duty of care is found to exist, the court must determine the
appropriate standard of care-a question of law.43 Since the beginning of
American jurisprudence, courts have defined negligence as conduct in which a
reasonable man would not engage. The FirstRestatement ofTorts "sets up the
reasonable person as the template for determining negligence.' s The
Restatementadopts a balancing approach that closely resembles a risk utility test:
"[T]he risk is unreasonable and the act is negligent if the risk is of such
magnitude as to outweigh what the law regards as the utility of the act or of the
particular manner in which it is done." Furthermore, the "Restatement expects
these risk-utility judgments to be... based on the values public opinion assigns
to different interests."' Francis Bohlen, the Reporter of the FirstRestatement
of Torts stated:
[T]he "reasonable man" is not the average man. He is an ideal
creature, expressing public opinion declared by its accredited
spokesman, whether court or jury, as to what ought to be done under
the circumstances by a man, who is not so engrossed in his own affairs
as to disregard the effect of his conduct upon the interests of others.
He may be called a personification of the court or jury's social
judgment. The factor controlling the judgment of the defendant's
conduct is not what is, but what ought to be.'M

42. Id.
43. See Harris v. Niehaus, 857 S.W.2d 222,226 (Mo. 1993) (A premises liability
case in which the court held as a matter of law that the condition in dispute was "open
and obvious" and thus determined the appropriate standard of care to apply.).
44. See Stephen G. Gilles, On Determining Negligence: Hand Formula Balancing,
The Reasonable Person Standard, and The Jury 7 (Sept. 14, 2000) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author).
45. lId "Because the SecondRestatement made only minor changes to the relevant
provisions, the FirstRestatement's conception of negligence has effectively been the
ALI's official position for almost seventy years." Id. at 6 (footnote omitted).
46. Id. at 8 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 291 (1965)).
47. Id. at 14. Thus, the reasonable person is "endowed with the 'standard
morality,' that is the standard ability to evaluate interests, and therefore 'evaluates
interests in accordance with the valuation placed upon them by the community sentiment
crystalized into law."' Id. at 15 (citation omitted). The reasonable person is guided by
morals that track the comparative values of the community. Id. at 16.
48. Id. at 17-18 (citing Francis Bohlen, Mixed Questions ofLmv andFact, 24 U.
PA. L.REv. 111, 113 (1924)).
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Thus, the standard of negligence cannot be applied using unchanging principles
of law, but must be based on a standard of conduct that is able to change with the
social values of the time.49

The amount of care in a given situation must be commensurate with the risk
involved-as the danger increases, the individual is required to exercise a greater
degree of care. 50 Some courts seem to imply that a special standard is required
depending on the level of risk.5 ' However, legal scholars note that, regardless
of the emergence of these "special standards," it appears that none of these
"cases should logically call for any departure from the usual formula. What is
required is merely the conduct of the reasonable person of ordinary prudence
under the circumstances, and the greater the danger, or the greater responsibility,
is merely
one of the circumstances, demanding only an increased amount of
,5 2
care. 1
Indeed, a substantial number of jurisdictions, including Missouri,
"recognize a higher or lower basic standard of conduct for different defendants,
or different situations."53 However, Professor Keeton indicates that "[t]here is
seldom reason to think that [courts] mean to say anything more than that greater
or less care will be required under the circumstances" and "the 'high degree'

49. Id. at 20.
50. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS §

34, at 208 (5th ed. 1984). In Bronson v. Kansas City, 323 S.W.2d 526 (Mo. Ct. App.
1959), the court stated:
While the duty owed is that of exercising ordinary care it is well recognized
that where children are concerned the exercise of ordinary care requires the
exercise of more vigilance and caution than might be sufficient with respect
to an adult .... Conduct which might reach the standard of ordinary care
with respect to an adult might in the case of a child amount to negligence, or
even gross negligence.

Id. at 531; see also 65 C.J.S. Negligence § 11(4) (1966) ('The care to be exercised in a
particular case must always be proportionate to the seriousness of the consequences

which are reasonably to be anticipated as a result of the conduct in question.").
51. See KEETON, supranote 50, § 34, at 209 (describing language that indicates
differing standards or "degrees" of care).
52. KEETON, supra note 50, § 34, at 209; see also 3 FOWLER V. HARPER ETAL., THE

LAW OF TORTS § 16.13, at 500-01 (2d ed. 1986) (citations omitted) ("According to
prevailing modem doctrine this proportioning of care to danger does not mean that
different degrees of care (or of negligence) are being applied, because the legal standard
remains constant-namely, what a reasonably prudent person would do in all the
circumstances.").
53. KEETON, supra note 50, § 34, at 209; see also Pierce v. Platte-Clay Elec. Coop.,
769 S.W.2d 769, 771 & n. 1 (Mo. 1989) (citations omitted) ("Since the circumstances of
this accident did not involve the inherently dangerous properties of electricity, the
'highest degree of care' standard which is utilized when electricity is the agent of injury
is not applicable. The appropriate standard is ordinary care.").
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instruction is unlikely ever really to mislead the jury."' Courts have found that
when negligence leads to serious injury, "and where the means of avoiding the
infliction of injury upon others [were] completely within the party's power,
ordinary care require[d] almost the utmost degree of human vigilance and
foresight."55 Furthermore, "[w]here the danger may extend to taking of human
'
life, reasonable care is very great care."56
With regard to electricity, the general rule is that an electric utility must
exercise reasonable care or care in proportion to the danger." Just as with
general negligence, many courts recognize that when electricity or electric wires
are involved, even ordinary care may require a high degree of care. 58 Depending
upon the specific circumstances, the proper care required is the highest degree
of care.59
In Piercev. Platte-ClayElectric Cooperative,Inc.,68 the Missouri Supreme
Court declared that an electric company must indeed use a "high degree of care"
to protect persons from injury resulting from the inherently dangerous

54. KEETON, supranote 50, § 34, at 209.
55. 65 C.J.S. Negligence § 11(4) (1966).
56. 65 CJ.S. Negligence § 11(4) (1966); see also Hall v. Dexter Gas Co., 170 So.
2d 796, 800 (Ala. 1965) (citations omitted) ("In matters involving the safety of human
life, such care and vigilance must be exercised as a due regard for the sacredness of
human life demands."); Commonwealth Trust Co. of Pittsburgh v. Carnegie-Ill. Steel
Co., 44 A.2d 594, 596 (Pa. 1945) (citations omitted) ("\lhen human life is at stake the
rule of due care and diligence requires everything that gives reasonable promise of its
preservation to be done regardless of difficulties or expense.").
57. See Gladden v. Mo. Pub. Serv. Co., 277 S.W.2d 510, 515 (Mo. 1955) (The
Rule in Missouri is that the owner of electrical lines must exercise the highest degree of
care to prevent injury to those who may lawfully be in close proximity to them.); Foote
v. Scott-New Madrid-Mississippi Elec. Coop., 359 S.W.2d 40,43 (Mo. Ct. App. 1962)
("[A]n electric company is obligated to employ the highest degree of care" to protect
from injury those that may lawfully "come into close proximity to such lines and thereby
may be subjected to a reasonable likelihood of injury."); 29 C.J.S. Electricity § 39
(1965).
58. See Simpson v. Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co., 138 A. 114, 116 (NJ. Sup.
Ct. 1927); 29 CJ.S. Electricity § 39 (1965) ("[Ihe degree of care is properly defined as
ordinary or reasonable care, but the degree of care varies with the circumstances and
what constitutes ordinary care increases as the danger increases.").
59. See Rice v. Ky. Util. Co., 155 S.W.2d 760,762 (Ky. Ct. App. 1941); Simpson,
138 A. at 116; 29 C.J.S. Electricity § 39 (1965) ("Those engaged in the business of
conducting electricity over high-voltage wires are bound to exercise greater precaution
in its use than if the property were of a less dangerous character, and are, therefore,
bound to anticipate more remote possibilities of danger.... [Tihe degree of care
required has been variously stated to be great care; high degree of foresight; high degree
of diligence and foresight; high degree of watchfulness; all that human care, vigilance,
and foresight can reasonably do; ...[etc.]").

60. 769 S.W.2d 769 (Mo. 1989).
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propensities of electricity. 6' Pierce involved an injury that occurred when a
farmer, while driving a tractor, ran into an unmarked guy wire that was
supporting a utility pole.62 An automobile then struck the cable, which tightened
suddenly and caught Pierce's right leg.63 The Piercecourt refused to apply the
"highest degree of care" standard because the guy wire was not charged with
current, and as such it did not "pose the special type of danger that would justify
the higher standard of care."' Pierceheld that only ordinary care was required
when the injury was not caused by the inherently dangerous propensities of
electricity.65
IV. INSTANT DECISION
A. The Majority
In Lopez v. Three Rivers Electric Cooperative,Inc.," the Missouri Supreme
Court considered whether Three Rivers owed a duty of care to George Lopez
and Kenney Jones, and if so, what standard of care Three Rivers was required
to use in protecting them.67 To recover in an action for negligence, a plaintiff
must first establish that she was owed a duty of care by the defendant.6" The
majority followed the analysis ofHoover's Dairy in determining whether Three
Rivers owed a duty to Lopez and Jones. 69 Hoover's Dairy declared that in the
absence of a duty created by a relationship between the defendant and the
plaintiff, under the principles of general negligence law, "foreseeability that
some injury might result from the act complained of normally serves as the
paramount factor in determining the existence of a duty."7'
In determining whether Three Rivers should have foreseen a probability of
injury to the plaintiffs, the majority relied on Zuber.7' The Zuber court defined
foreseeability, in determining duty, as the presence of "some probability or

61. Id. at 771 &n.1.
62. Id. at 770.
63. Id. at 771.
64. Lopez v. Three Rivers Elec. Coop., Inc., 26 S.W.3d 151, 162 (Mo. 2000)
(Price, C.J., dissenting) (discussing Pierce).
65. Pierce,769 S.W.2d at 771 n.1.
66. 26 S.W.3d 151 (Mo. 2000).
67. Id. at 154-58.
68. See Krause v. U.S. Truck Co., 787 S.W.2d 708, 710 (Mo. 1990) ("In any action
for negligence, the plaintiff must establish an existence of a duty on the part of the
defendant to protect plaintiff from injury, failure of the defendant to perform that duty
and, that plaintiff's injury was proximately caused by defendant's failure.").
69. See Lopez, 26 S.W.3d at 156.
70. Id. (quoting Hoover's Dairy, Inc. v. Mid-Am. Dairymen, Inc., 700 S.W.2d 426,
431 (Mo. 1985)).
71. Id. (citing Zuber v. Clarkson Const. Co., 251 S.W.2d 52 (Mo. 1952)).
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likelihood... of harm sufficiently serious that ordinary men would take
precautions to avoid it .... 72 Zuber further defined the test as "not the balance
of probabilities, but of the existence of some probability of sufficient moment to
induce the reasonable mind to take the precautions which would avoid it.' 7 In
the case at bar, the majority determined that there was sufficient evidence to
show that "Three Rivers should have foreseen that there existed some probability
of sufficient moment that an injury could occur."74 Thus, the majority concluded
that because Three Rivers knew of the risk of harm that power lines pose to low
flying aircrafl, it owed a duty in tort to the plaintiffs. 5
The court next turned to the standard of care Three Rivers owed to Lopez
and Jones.7 6 The court looked to Pierce for guidance and determined that, as

72. Zuber, 251 S.W.2d at 55; see also supratext accompanying note 42.
73. Zuber, 251 SAV.2d at 55; see also Lopez v. Three Rivers Elec. Coop., Inc., 26
S.W.3d 151, 156 (Mo. 2000).
74. Lopez, 26 SAV.3d at 156. The plaintiffs "presented evidence that Three Rivers
was aware of a similar incident that had occurred in 1975, resulting in three fatalities."
Id. That aircraft "had been tracking... bald eagles along the Osage River [and] struck
Three Rivers' power lines at the same location as the accident in this case." Id. (citing
Allnutt v. United States, 498 F. Supp. 832 (V.D. Mo. 1980)). There also was a near miss
at the same location in 1974, which Three Rivers was made aware of through a "copy of
deposition testimony regarding the incident." Id. Further, Michael Harp, the former
president and chief executive officer of Three Rivers' insurance company, testified that
"he and his employees informed Three Rivers, at least generally, about the dangers of
having unmarked power lines over the Osage River.... Mr. Harp also testified that he
discussed with Three Rivers the presence of military and civilian aircraft flying at low
altitudes over the Osage River." Id. at 156-57 (footnote omitted). There was also
testimony from other witnesses who "had seen aircraft nearly miss, and even fly under,
the power lines." Id. at 157.
75. Id.
76. Id. The trial court instructed the jury using a "highest standard of care"
instruction. Id. The applicable instructions were as follows:
On the claim of plaintiff... for compensatory damages for wrongful death
against [Three Rivers], you must assess a percentage of fault to [Three Rivers]
if you believe:
First, [Three Rivers] maintained power lines across the Osage River without
marker balls thereon to wam pilots of their existence and as a result, the
power lines were not reasonably safe for persons flying in aircraft over the
Osage River, and
Second, [Three Rivers] knew of this condition and knew that such condition
was not reasonably safe; and
Third, [Three Rivers] knew or had information from which [Three Rivers], in
the exercise of the highest degree of care,should have known that persons
such as the pilots would not discover such condition or realize the risk of
harm; and
Fourth, [Three Rivers] failed to use the highest degree ofcare to adequately
warn of it; and
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a matter of law, the proper standard of care was ordinary care, not the highest
degree of care as was required by the trial court." The court then noted that,
under Root v. Mudd, 79 "[p]rejudice is ordinarily presumed when a jury
instruction imposes upon a party a standard of care greater than that required by
law."' Thus, because Three Rivers was subject to a higher standard of care than
was required under the law, the court determined that Three Rivers was
prejudiced in that the instructions "deprived the jury of the ability to find that an
ordinarily careful person, considering all of the circumstances, would not have
placed warnings on the power lines."8
The court next turned to the issue of evidence of a similar accident. 82 Three
Rivers argued that the trial court erred when it determined that the evidence of
the similar accident involving an airplane crash at the same accident site in 1975
was admissible.83 The court held that this evidence was admissible and
explained that "[r]emoteness in time goes to the weight of the evidence in most
circumstances, not to its admissibility."84
Finally, the court addressed the issue of punitive damages.85 The court
relied on Rodriguez v. Suzuki Motor Corp.86 for the proposition that "there must

be clear and convincing evidence in support of' a claim for damages for
aggravating circumstances. The court indicated that a plaintiff can recover
punitive damages by showing that the defendant knew or had reason to know
that it was very likely that the defendant's conduct would lead to injury, and if

Fifth, such failure directly caused or directly contributed to cause [George
Lopez's/Kenney Jones'] death.
The phrase "highest degree of care" as used in this instruction means that
degree ofcare that a very carefulperson would use under the same or similar
circumstance.
Id. at 157-58. Three Rivers subsequently objected to these instructions. Id. at 158.
77. The Pierce court noted in a footnote that where an "accident did not involve
the inherently dangerous properties of electricity, the 'highest degree of care' standard
which is utilized when electricity is the agent of injury is not applicable." Pierce v.
Platte-Clay Elec. Coop., Inc., 769 S.W.2d 769, 771 n.1 (Mo. 1989) (citing Poumeroule
v. Postal Tel. & Cable Co., 152 S.W. 114 (Mo. Ct. App. 1912)).
78. See Lopez, 26 S.W.3d at 158.
79. 981 S.W.2d 651 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998).
80. Id. at 656.
81. Lopez v. Three Rivers Elec. Coop., Inc., 26 S.W.3d 151, 158 (Mo. 2000).
82. Id. at 159.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 160; see also State v. Bernard, 849 S.W.2d 10, 19-20 (Mo. 1993) (stating
that remoteness in time goes to the weight of the evidence).
85. See Lopez, 26 S.W.3d at 160.
86. 936 S.W.2d 104 (Mo. 1996).
87. Lopez v. Three Rivers Elec. Coop., Inc., 26 S.W.3d 151, 160 (Mo. 2000)
(citing Rodriguez, 936 S.W.2d at 110).
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the defendant's conduct was equivalent to intentional misconduct.' The
majority concluded that the evidence presented at trial did not "rise to the level
required for submitting an instruction based upon aggravating circumstances.""
Because the majority found that punitive damages were unavailable, it did not
have to reach a decision regarding the constitutionality of Missouri Revised
Statutes Section 537.675(2)."'
B. The Dissent
The dissent?1 agreed with the majority that Three Rivers owed a duty of care
to Lopez and Jones, but disagreed as to the degree of care required.' Chief
Justice Price began with the proposition that 'issouri... has always demanded
the highest degree of care regarding dangerous instrumentalities because of the
great risk of injury or death," and he questioned why the majority declared that
standard inapplicable simply because the harm in this case "did not result from
the electricity carried by the lines, but instead merely from colliding with the line
[sic] itself."9 3 Pierce,principally relied on by the majority,9 involved an injury
that occurred when a farmer, while driving a tractor, ran into an unmarked guy
wire that was supporting a utility pole.9" The court in Pierce held that because
the guy wire was not charged wvith current, it did not involve the inherently
dangerous propensities of electricity, and as such, "was held not to pose the
special type of danger that would justify the higher standard of care."' The
dissent distinguished the facts under which Lopez arose from those in Pierce 7
In Pierce,the guy wire posed no independent threat of grave danger.9 3 Lopez is
distinct because even though the danger was not from electrocution, an equally
dangerous condition arose from the wires' "ability to cause almost certain death
to the passengers of any aircraft that might strike them."' Further, the "danger

88. Id. (citing Hoover's Dairy, Inc. v. Mid-Am. Dairymen, Inc., 700 S.W.2d 426,
436 (Mo. 1952)); see also Alack v. Vic Tanny Int'l, 923 S.W.2d 330,338-39 (Mo. 1996).
89. Lopez, 26 S.W.3d at 160.
90. I.at 161. The Missouri aggravating circumstances instruction can be found
at Missouri Revised Statutes Section 537.675(2) (2000).
91. Chief Justice Price authored the dissent, with which Judge White and Judge
Wolfe concurred. See Lopez, 26 S.W.3d at 162.
92. Id. at 162-64.
93. Id. at 162 (citations omitted).
94. See supra text accompanying notes 61, 78.
95. See Pierce v. Platte-Clay Elec. Coop., Inc., 769 S.W.2d 769, 770 (Mo. 1989).
96. Lopez v. Three Rivers Elec. Coop., Inc., 26 S.W.3d 151, 162 (Mo. 2000)
(Price, C.J., dissenting) (discussing Pierce).
97. Id.
98. See Pierce,769 S.W.2d at 770-71 & n.1.
99. Lopez, 26 S.W.3d at 162 (Price, C.J., dissenting) (discussing Pierce).
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was compounded because the electrical wires were practically invisible to
approaching aircraft, constituting a deadly trap."'
Chief Justice Price noted two cases from Pennsylvania that were cited by
the plaintiffs, but not discussed by the majority."10 Both Yoffee v. Pennsylvania
Power& Light Co." and Bailey v. PennsylvaniaElectric Co." involved aircraft
collisions with unmarked power lines.'
The Yoffee court held the power
company to the highest degree of care because an air collision, like an
electrocution, carries "a high probability of death or serious injury."' ' The
Bailey court cited heavily from Yoffee in its opinion and concluded the electric
company "had a duty to take all practicable precautions necessary to preserve
life,"' 6 and it held that it was "evident that [the utility] was properly held to a
high, not ordinary duty of care. .. ."" The dissent agreed with the premises of
the Yoffee and Baily decisions and argued that "the highest degree of care [was]
applicable where, as here, a prior fatal air strike occurred at the same location
alerting the utility to the life threatening potential of its power lines to aircraft
03
because of their particular location, construction, and lack of warning."'
Chief Justice Price, conceding for the purpose of argument that the highest
standard of care instruction was inappropriate, then turned to the issue of
prejudice." The dissent did not believe prejudice resulted under the facts of this
case, thus rebutting the usual presumption of prejudice when a jury has been
instructed regarding a higher standard of care than required by law." 0 Citing
Fowler v. Park Corp.,"' the dissent distinguished Root,"2 and asserted that
"[w]hether prejudice actually exists... is not to be taken for granted, but has to
be determined by the court."''3 Chief Justice Price argued that in this case the

100. Id.
101. Id.
102. 123 A.2d 636 (Pa. 1956).
103. 598 A.2d 41 (Pa. Super. 1991).
104. See Lopez v. Three Rivers Elec. Coop., Inc., 26 S.W.3d 151, 162 (Mo. 2000).
105. Id. (citing Bailey, 598 A.2d at 47).
106. Bailey, 598 A.2d at 45.
107. Id. at 47.
108. Id. It is interesting to note that, prior to the ruling in Lopez, the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals, applying Missouri law to the identical facts in this case, agreed with
the dissent's analysis. See Nanninga v. Three Rivers Elec. Coop., Inc., 203 F.3d 529,
532 (8th Cir. 2000). Nanninga arose out of the same facts as Lopez and was brought in
federal court by one of the two other crew members on board the helicopter. See id. at
531; see also supranotes 4-7 and accompanying text; infra Part V.
109. See Lopez, 26 S.W.3d at 162-63.
110. Id.
111. 673 S.W.2d 749, 755 (Mo. 1984).
112. The majority relied on Root in determining that Three Rivers was prejudiced
by the highest standard of care instruction. See supra text accompanying notes 79-80.
113. Lopez v. Three Rivers Elec. Coop., Inc., 26 S.W.3d 151, 163 (Mo. 2000).
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instructions differed only in that one instruction called for the care "that a very
careful person" would use, while the other required "that degree of care that an
ordinarily careful and prudent person would use."' 4 The exercise of ordinary
care in Missouri "must be 'commensurate with the dangers to be apprehended.'
Thus, the conduct necessary to fulfill the duty of ordinary care depends upon the
circumstances."" 5 The dissent found that, even under the standard of an
ordinarily prudent person, Three Rivers was required to be very careful; thus,
Three Rivers was not prejudiced by the highest degree of care instruction." 6
Lastly, the dissent addressed the comparative fault assigned to the flight
engineer, George Lopez.' 17 Chief Justice Price noted that Lopez was merely a
passenger and utilized an analogy to automobile tort liability." 8 In automobile
cases, a "driver's negligence is not imputed to a passenger, absent a showing of
joint enterprise, because the passenger has no control over the automobile's
operation.'. 9 Because there was no evidence that "Lopez had legal or actual
ability regarding the flight plan or piloting of the helicopter,""' the dissent
negligence attributed to [the] pilot Jones cannot be
concluded that "[a]ny
''
imputed to Lopez. 2
V. COMMENT
The court in Lopez concluded that Three Rivers did not owe Lopez and
Jones more than ordinary care in warning them of the danger of flying into
power lines crossing the Osage River." The court further held that, because the
jury was instructed as to the highest degree of care, Three Rivers was unduly

Chief Justice Price agreed that normally prejudice will be presumed when the jury is
instructed as to a higher degree of care than required by law. Id. However, he would not
take this prejudice for granted, but would have it determined by the court by "considering
the actual language of the instructions as used, opposed to the language of the
instructions as they should have been given, to the evidence received in the case." Id.
114. Id. (citations omitted).
115. Id. (citing Cameron v. Small, 182 S.W.2d 565, 569 (Mo. 1944)).
116. See id "I simply do not believe in the circumstances ofthis case that it would
have made a difference that the jury was asked to determine the issue of Three Rivers'
negligence in terms of an 'ordinarily careful' person being very careful, as opposed to
that of 'a very careful person."' Id. (citing Fowler, 673 S.W.2d at 755). Further, the
dissent noted that "the trend in modem tort law is to disclaim varying degrees of care in
describing the duty element of negligence." Id. (citations omitted).
117. Seeid at 163-64.
118. Id at 164. Lopez was "not the pilot ... and had no control of the flight." Id.
119. Id. (citing Will v. Gillian, 439 S.W.2d 498 (Mo. 1969)).
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. See id at 158; see supra text accompanying note 78.
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prejudiced and should receive a new trial." This decision is at odds with legal
commentators and current trends across the country. 24 In his treatise, Professor
Keeton clearly indicates his preference for a single standard of care to be applied
in all negligence cases."z Moreover, Professor Keeton argues that there is no
real difference if a jurisdiction elects to instruct on varying degrees of care.'26
Even though courts purport to recognize varying degrees of care for different
situations and different defendants, rarely do such courts mean "anything more
than that greater or lesser care will be required under the circumstances."' 27
The majority utilized only five sentences to determine the standard of care
owed by Three Rivers.'
The court cited a footnote from Pierce without
discussion of any similarities or differences between it and the case at hand, and
simply concluded that any time "electricity is not the agent of injury" the utility
is held only to ordinary care. 29 The majority offered no discussion regarding the
inherently dangerous propensities of practically invisible power lines at a
location Three Rivers knew was dangerous based on previous deaths that
occurred in the same manner at the same location. A logical extension of such
a blind application of the Piercerule could conceivably shield all electric utilities
from liability in "non-electrical" situations that would normally require the
highest degree of care. This rule, in determining the degree of care only after an
accident occurs, diminishes "the law's ability to promote safe behavior and...
at least partially circumvent[s] the purposes of Missouri's law of negligence."' 30
The conclusion and analysis of the dissent seems to fall more within the
framework established by Missouri courts as well as other courts nationally.'
While Missouri continues to recognize varying degrees of care, Missouri courts
123. See Lopez v. Three Rivers Elec. Coop., Inc., 26 S.W.3d 151, 158 (Mo. 2000).
124. See KEETON, supranote 50, § 34, at 210.
Although the idea of 'degrees of negligence' has not been without its
advocates, it has been condemned by most writers.... it adds only difficulty
and confusion to the already nebulous and uncertain standards which must be
given to the jury. The prevailing rule in most situations is that there are no
'degrees' of care or negligence, as a matter of law; there are only different
amounts of care, as a matter of fact.
KEETON, supranote 50, § 34, at 210-11; see also HARPER, supra note 52, § 16.13, at 503
& n.13 (citations omitted) ("For the most part ... modem accident law has repudiated
the notion that different degrees of care are exacted of people standing in different
relationships to an injured party."); Gilles, supra note 44, at 18-20; supra note 50.
125. See KEETON, supra note 50, § 34, at 210. For other commentators with a
similar point of view, see HARPER, supra note 52, § 16.13, at 503 & n.13.
126. See KEETON, supranote 50, § 34, at 209.
127. KEETON, supra note 50, § 34, at 209.
128. See Lopez, 26 S.W.3d at 158.
129. Id.; see supratext accompanying notes 92-93.
130. Nanninga v. Three Rivers Elec. Coop., Inc., 203 F.3d 529, 532 (8th Cir.
2000).
131. See supranotes 50, 124.
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also have held that "[t]he care to be exercised in a particular case must always
be proportionate to the seriousness of the consequences which are reasonably to
be anticipated as a result of the conduct in question."' 32 While the majority did
not assess the "seriousness of the consequences" of flying into unmarked power
lines, the dissent did perform such an analysis.'33 Chief Justice Price noted that
the wires "were uniquely dangerous because of their ability to cause almost
certain death to the passengers of any aircraft that might strike them."'"
Because Three Rivers was required, even as an ordinary person, to be very
careful, there seems little practical difference between the arguments made under
either instruction.'35 As Chief Justice Price noted, this case is illustrative of the
questionable utility of varying degrees of care. 3 '
Adding credence to the dissent's position is the fact that the Eighth Circuit,
applying Missouri law to the identical facts in this case, agreed with the dissent's
analysis.'37 The Eighth Circuit concluded:
Had electricity killed the decedent, it appears likely that Missouri
courts would apply the duty of the highest degree of care, because
such a duty applies even when the exact injury or manner in which it
came about is unforeseeable. The mere fortuity that electricity did not
in fact cause plaintiffs' decedent any injury is a slim basis on which to
distinguish the case law imposing the highest degree of care on
suppliers of electricity. 3
That court also concluded that a rule "leaving the applicable standard of care to
be sorted out after an accident occurs... would diminish the law's ability to
promote safe behavior and..,139at least partially circumvent the purposes of
Missouri's law of negligence."'
Even conceding multiple degrees of care and that the "highest degree of
care" instruction was error, it does not necessarily follow that Three Rivers was
prejudiced by this error. The majority offered a more thorough analysis on the
issue of prejudice than it did regarding the standard of care, but its logic seems

132. Bronson v. Kansas City, 323 S.W.2d 526, 531 (Mo. Ct. App. 1959) (citing
Stumpf v. Panhandle E. Pipeline Co., 189 S.W.2d 223, 227 (Mo. 1945)).
133. See Lopez v. Three Rivers Elec. Coop., Inc., 26 S.W.3d 151, 162 (Mo. 2000).
134. Id.
135. Id. at 163.
136. See id. Chief Justice Price indicated a willingness to consider a single
standard of care and acknowledged that "the trend in modem tort law is to disclaim
varying degrees of care in describing the duty element of negligence." Id. (citations
omitted).

137. See Nanninga v. Three Rivers Elec. Coop., 203 F.3d 529, 532 (8th Cir. 2000);
see also text accompanying note 110.
138. Nanninga,203 F.3d at 532 (citations omitted).
139. Id.
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at odds with that of legal scholars and precedent.140 In determining whether
prejudice actually existed in this case, the court should have examined the
practical difference between the "highest degree of care" instruction and the
"ordinary care" instruction.' 4' Because anyone flying into the power lines
crossing the river would probably be killed or seriously injured, even under
ordinary care, Three Rivers should be required to use a very high
standard of
43
care.' 42 Any error imparted to the jury must have been slight.'
VI. CONCLUSION

The Missouri Supreme Court established in Lopez that ordinary care is all
that is required by the owner of a utility in warning aircraft of dangerous power
lines.' 44 The court reaffirmed that Missouri will continue to recognize varying
standards of care depending upon the circumstances of injury.'45 Further, with
regard to electric utilities, the court indicated that power companies will be held
to "the highest standard of care" only when the injury is caused by the inherently
dangerous properties of electricity.'" Because instructing the jury regarding a
higher degree of care than required by law will be held to be reversible error,
attorneys must carefully evaluate whether the dangers involved in a particular
situation will require such a higher degree of care. With respect to electricity,
it seems that only injury from electrocution will meet such a requirement.
However, Lopez's 4-3 decision indicates a firm disagreement within the court.
While the majority decision indicates adherence to the traditional rule in
Missouri regarding the standard of care, Chief Justice Price's dissent favors at
least the application of the "highest standard of care" to any injury resulting from
a dangerous instrumentality and at most a move toward the single standard of
care endorsed by legal scholars. Such a controversy suggests that this is a
decision that could be revisited should the composition of the court change.
BRETT A. EMISON

140. See supranotes 50-59 and accompanying text.
141. This is the argument urged by Chief Justice Price in his dissent. See Lopez
v. Three Rivers Elec. Coop., Inc., 26 S.W.3d 151, 163 (Mo. 2000).
142. See Cameron v. Small, 182 S.W.2d 565, 569 (Mo. 1944) ("The exercise of
ordinary care as defined by our instructions must be 'commensurate with the dangers to
be apprehended."'); Bronson v. Kansas City, 323 S.W.2d 526, 531 (Mo. Ct. App. 1959)
("[T]he care to be exercised in a particular case must always be proportionate to the
seriousness of the consequences which are reasonably to be anticipated as a result of the
conduct in question.").
143. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
144. Lopez, 26 S.W.3d at 158.
145. See id.
146. See id.
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